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This paper proposes a mathematical explanation of how conscious experiences 
(i.e. qualia) arise from a physical basis. It argues that the explanatory gap (Levine, 
1983) central to the hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 1995) can be 
bridged via equations featuring singularities that can intuitively explain how 
objectively unmeasurable properties (identified with qualia) arise from 
objectively measurable processes (identified with physical processes). That is to 
say, this paper proposes that qualia correspond to singularities in the 
mathematical descriptions of certain physical processes. This proposal may have 
been foreshadowed by Srinivasa Ramanujan. 
 
1 The hard problem of consciousness and the explanatory gap 
At the core of the mind-body problem is the hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 
1995): 
The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience ... Why 
is it that when our cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information-
processing, we have visual or auditory experience: the quality of deep blue, the 
sensation of middle C? ... It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical 
basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises.  
Our lack of an explanation of how conscious experiences (i.e. qualia) arise from a 
physical basis represents an explanatory gap (Levine, 1983) in our understanding of the 
world. The explanatory gap is central to the hard problem (Majeed, 2015). To bridge 
the explanatory gap – and thereby make progress on the hard problem – we need an 
explanation of how qualia arise from a physical basis. For example, to bridge the explanatory 
gap, we need an explanation of how the conscious experience of pain arises from the 
physical basis of “the firing of C fibers” (Levine, 1983). 
Leading theories of consciousness – including physicalism (e.g. Churchland, 1983; 
Dennett, 1991), property dualism (e.g. Chalmers, 1996), neutral monism (e.g. Russell, 
1927; Strawson, 1994), and integrated information theory (e.g. Tononi, 2004; Koch, 
2012) – each attempt to bridge (or circumvent) the explanatory gap and thereby make 
progress on the hard problem. However, each theory faces significant and well-
documented challenges.  
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Notwithstanding its challenges, property dualism in particular provides an alluring 
conceptual framework in which to approach the explanatory gap and thereby the hard 
problem. In its conventional specification (Chalmers, 1996), property dualism posits 
that there exists one type of substance (physical substance), but there exist two types of 
properties of substances (physical properties and mental properties). The physical 
properties of a physical substance, such as a brain, are its microphysical properties (e.g. 
mass) and emergent physical properties (e.g. temperature) that are logically supervenient 
on its microphysical properties. In addition to these physical properties, there can be 
other properties of physical substances that are not microphysical properties or 
emergent physical properties but rather are mental properties (i.e. qualia). Such qualia 
(e.g. the quality of deep blue, the sensation of middle C), are irreducible to description 
in physical terms and are thus “left out of the physicalist story” (Jackson, 1982).  
Notwithstanding the fact that property dualism accounts for qualia in an elegant 
conceptual framework, it does not presently bridge the explanatory gap because it does 
not presently explain how qualia arise from a physical basis. This paper will propose 
such an explanation. In the spirit of Galileo’s intuition that the great book of nature is 
written in the language of mathematics, and in light of the since-proven “unreasonable 
effectiveness” (Wigner, 1960) of mathematics in explaining other aspects of the world, 
the explanation to be proposed is mathematical in nature.  
2 The foundation for a mathematical explanation of how qualia arise from a 
physical basis 
Although it does not do so yet, there is reason to suspect that physics – and more 
specifically its equations – will eventually provide an accurate mechanistic description 
of the world (Weinberg, 1992). However, as the existence of the explanatory gap makes 
clear, any such description of the world will not be a complete mechanistic description of 
the world unless it explains how qualia arise from a physical basis. At present, physics 
is silent on this point.  
A fundamental reason for this silence – and the foundation for the mathematical 
explanation to be proposed – is a fundamental dichotomy in the nature of physical 
properties, on the one hand, and qualia, on the other hand. One the one hand, physical 
properties, such as mass or temperature, are objectively measurable properties (i.e. they 
have objectively measurable magnitudes); on the other hand, qualia, such as the quality 
of deep blue or the sensation of middle C (as opposed to their neural correlates), are 
objectively unmeasurable properties.1 On this view, physical properties can thus be 
                                                          
1 Recognition of this fundamental dichotomy in the objective measurability of physical properties, on 
the one hand, and qualia, on the other hand dates to at least Leibniz’s (1714) mill argument: 
“[S]upposing that there were a mechanism so constructed as to think, feel and have perception, we 
might enter it as into a mill. And this granted, we should only find on visiting it, pieces which push 
one against another, but never anything by which to explain a perception.” 
3 
   
 
identified with objectively measurable properties, whereas qualia can be identified with 
objectively unmeasurable properties (i.e. physical properties : objectively measurable 
properties :: qualia : objectively unmeasurable properties).  
Since the equations of physics describe the objectively measurable properties of 
physical processes and predict their objectively measurable magnitudes, such equations 
seem incapable of explaining how qualia – being objectively unmeasurable properties 
that do not have objectively measurable magnitudes – arise from such physical 
processes. Thus, qualia have, unsurprisingly, been left out of the physicalist story and 
we are left with the explanatory gap.   
However, if (1) it is in principle possible to provide a complete mechanistic 
description of the world via equations and (2) the world does in fact include qualia 
(identified with objectively unmeasurable properties) that arise from certain physical 
processes (identified with objectively measurable processes), then it follows that there 
should be equations that can explain how such objectively unmeasurable properties 
arise from such objectively measurable processes. In other words, it may be possible to 
bridge the explanatory gap between qualia and their physical basis via equations that 
can explain how objectively unmeasurable properties (identified with qualia) arise from 
objectively measurable processes (identified with physical processes). 
3 A proposed mathematical explanation of how qualia arise from a physical 
basis 
In fact, there are equations that can explain how objectively unmeasurable properties 
arise from objectively measurable processes and could thus, it will be argued, bridge the 
explanatory gap. These are equations featuring singularities – points at which the value 
of an equation becomes undefined.  
To illustrate, suppose that the firing of a particular type of neuron (N) is determined 
to be the neural correlate of the experience of the quality of deep blue.  The firing of N 
is thus a physical process from which arises, seemingly inexplicably, an instance of an 
objectively unmeasurable property (in the form of a deep blue quale). Suppose further 
that N is discovered to have a previously unknown property (Ω) that is described by the 
following equation over the course of a given firing of N: 
Ω = 1|𝑣𝑣| 
where ν is some variable that flips sign from negative, through zero, to positive around 
the moment of the firing’s peak intensity. This equation features a singularity at v = 0 
(which corresponds to the moment of the firing’s peak intensity), where its value is 
undefined (not infinite). The dynamics of Ω over the course of a given firing of N would 
correspond to the following graph2: 
                                                          
2  Fig. 1 and Fig. 2.b were created with Desmos. 
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    Fig. 1 
For a given firing of N, at all times before the moment of the firing’s peak intensity, 
Ω has an objectively measurable magnitude (e.g. when v = -2, the magnitude of Ω is 1 
/ 2) and thus Ω can be identified with a physical property. However, at the moment of 
the firing’s peak intensity, an anomaly occurs. At this moment, Ω has no objectively 
measurable magnitude (i.e. when v = 0, the magnitude of Ω is 1 / 0, which is undefined 
(not infinite)) and thus Ω cannot be identified with a physical property. At this moment 
(and for so long as v = 0), Ω is rather an objectively unmeasurable property. Finally, at 
all times after the moment of the firing’s peak intensity, Ω once again has an objectively 
measurable magnitude (e.g. when v = 2, the magnitude of Ω is 1 / 2) and thus Ω can 
once again be identified with a physical property.  
In light of these dynamics of Ω, the fact that an instance of an objectively 
unmeasurable property (in the form of a deep blue quale) arises from the firing of N is 
thus no longer inexplicable. Rather, the fact that such an objectively unmeasurable property 
arises from the firing of N is now intuitively explained by the presence of a singularity 
in the mathematical description of a property of N (namely, Ω). More generally, this 
indicates that equations featuring singularities can intuitively explain how objectively 
unmeasurable properties (identified with qualia) arise from objectively measurable 
processes (identified with physical processes) and that such equations can thereby 
bridge the explanatory gap. It is thus proposed that qualia correspond to singularities in 
the mathematical descriptions of certain physical processes.3 
                                                          
3 It may be objected that the magnitude of Ω appears to be unbounded as v approaches zero. However, 
so long as v is a discrete variable, the magnitude of Ω is not actually unbounded as v approaches zero. 
A discrete v reaches some non-infinitesimal smallest possible value before it reaches zero (and thus Ω 
reaches some finite largest possible magnitude before it becomes undefined). Alternatively, this 
objection is avoided if Ω is instead described by an equation that features a non-divergent singularity, 
such as: 
Ω = 1 − 𝑒𝑒(− 1𝑣𝑣2) 
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Even if it is correct that equations featuring singularities can intuitively explain how 
qualia arise from certain physical processes, such equations would not explain the 
intrinsic nature of qualia (e.g. their blueness). However, this is not surprising – the 
equations of physics likewise tell us nothing about the intrinsic nature of physical 
properties (Russell, 1927); rather, such an equation tells us that the physical property it 
describes arises and tells us its objectively measurable magnitude. In an analogous way, the 
equation describing an Ω-like property would tell us that the particular quale its 
singularity corresponds to (e.g. pain) arises and could perhaps be inferred to tell us 
something about such quale’s qualitative intensity. For example, we could perhaps infer 
that when a given Ω-like property’s magnitude at its singularity is, say 2 / 0 (and such 
property is thus objectively unmeasurable and can be identified with a quale), it has a 
greater qualitative intensity (e.g. intense pain) than when its magnitude at its singularity 
is 1 / 0 (e.g. half as much pain), in the same way that when a given physical property’s 
objectively measurable magnitude is 2, it has a greater physical magnitude than when its 
objectively measurable magnitude is 1. The foregoing thus indicates that qualia – and 
their qualitative intensities – correspond to singularities in the mathematical 
descriptions of certain physical processes. 
If the proposed explanation is correct, then there exists an Ω-like property of the 
neural correlate of each unique type of qualia (e.g. the quality of deep blue, the sensation 
of middle C), which Ω-like property is described by a correspondingly unique equation 
featuring a singularity that explains how an objectively unmeasurable quale arises from 
such objectively measurable neural correlate.  
The existence of such Ω-like properties of the neural correlates of consciousness is, 
of course, speculative. At first blush, it appears that action potential may be an Ω-like 
property of the neural correlates of consciousness: 
Action potential 
 
Fig. 2.a4 
Ω 
 
Fig 2.b 
                                                          
4 Adapted by permission from Macmillan Publishers Ltd: Nature Reviews Neuroscience (Bean, 2007), 
copyright 2007. 
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However, action potential appears to be continuously objectively measurable and 
thus not an Ω-like property in the necessary way. Nevertheless, the striking similarity 
between the dynamics of a known property of the neural correlates of consciousness 
and the dynamics of the posited Ω-like property of the neural correlates of 
consciousness is notable. It demonstrates that there are known dynamics of the neural 
correlates of consciousness that nearly precisely mirror the posited dynamics of the 
neural correlates of consciousness that would explain how qualia arise from such neural 
correlates and thereby bridge the explanatory gap. Although this striking similarity could 
be coincidental, it seems quite suggestive.  
4 Was the proposed mathematical explanation of how qualia arise from a 
physical basis foreshadowed by Srinivasa Ramanujan? 
The proposed mathematical explanation of how qualia arise from a physical basis may 
have been foreshadowed by Srinivasa Ramanujan – the celebrated early-20th century 
mathematician widely regarded as one of the greatest geniuses in history. Ramanujan, 
working in isolation in India and with nearly no formal training, independently 
rediscovered large swaths of mathematics and generated a multitude of highly novel, 
unconventional and groundbreaking results (Kanigel, 1992). Certain of his insights were 
recorded in cryptic terms and were not fully understood or appreciated until long after 
his death; others remain shrouded in mystery to this day. Ramanujan reported that some 
of his most profound insights came to him in dreams.  
Fascinatingly, in a particularly cryptic anecdote (Kanigel, 1992), Ramanujan 
recounted dreams in which he was  
[V]isited by images of his own abdomen as a kind of mathematical appendage 
with singularities, points in space marked by indefinable mathematical surges ... 
Intense pain might show up at x = 1, half as much pain at x = -1, and so on. 
The parallels between this anecdote and the proposed mathematical explanation of 
how qualia arise from a physical basis are striking. Parsed slightly differently, this 
anecdote conveys the notion that qualia (“pain”) of varying qualitative intensities 
(“intense pain … half as much pain”) correspond to singularities (“at x = 1 … at x = -
1”) in the mathematical description (“mathematical appendage”) of a physical object 
(“abdomen”). This notion nearly precisely matches the proposed mathematical 
explanation of how qualia arise from a physical basis – namely, that qualia – and their 
qualitative intensities – correspond to singularities in the mathematical descriptions of 
certain physical processes.  
It thus seems reasonable to conclude that the proposed mathematical explanation 
of how qualia arise from a physical basis was foreshadowed by Ramanujan. Such a 
conclusion, if correct, would lend significant credence to the proposed explanation.  
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5 Concluding thoughts 
Although it is presented within the conceptual framework of property dualism, the 
proposed mathematical explanation of how qualia arise from a physical basis has 
distinct monist and dual aspect (e.g. Nagel, 1986) undertones. The posited Ω-like 
properties are single properties that are objectively measurable, and thus can be identified 
with physical properties, at most times, but are objectively unmeasurable, and can thus 
be identified with qualia, at certain specific times. This dynamic suggests that there are 
not physical properties, on the one hand, and qualia, on the other hand; rather, there 
are simply properties, which properties can manifest in either physical or phenomenal 
form. This conception seems to accord with Chalmers’ (1996) notion that “Perhaps the 
physical and the phenomenal will turn out to be two different aspects of a single 
encompassing kind, in something like the way that matter and energy turn out to be 
two aspects of a single kind.”  
According to Chalmers (1996), we should expect the fundamental explanations in a 
theory of consciousness to be “simple and elegant.” The proposed mathematical 
explanation of how conscious experiences arise from a physical basis meets this 
expectation on both counts: it is simple, in that the equations that form its conceptual 
foundation involve only two-variable algebra, and it is elegant, in that it bridges the 
explanatory gap in an intuitive manner.  
Though it is speculative, the proposed explanation of how conscious experiences 
arise from a physical basis may bridge the explanatory gap and thereby afford a 
meaningful advance with respect to the hard problem.  
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